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I INTRODUCTION 
During the course of the last thirty years, the public perception of crime victims has 
changed dramatically. While the criminal justice system was once widely depicted as a 
contest between the accused and the State, it is now widely accepted that “justice” cannot 
be effectively meted out until criminal processes pay due recognition to the rights that at 
all stages of the criminal process. Across a wide variety of national jurisdictions, the 
range of protections and services available to victims of crime have undergone wholesale 
reform, which has resulted in a plethora of statutory and non-statutory protections. 
Depending on jurisdiction and mode of criminal process, the nature of these reforms has 
varied considerably, but generally they have resulted in increased special measures for 
victims at all stages of the criminal process, such as means to protect victims whilst 
testifying in court, mechanisms to increase access to information, as well as provisions 
designed to secure a more direct role for the victim in decision-making processes. In 
many jurisdictions, most notably the USA and Canada, debates continue on the 
practicability of victims‟ charters, bills of rights and victim-centred constitutional 
amendments.
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1
 Since 1980, all fifty states have adopted over 1,000 pieces of legislation to protect victims of crime, and 
foremost amongst them are “bills of rights” for victims, and thirty-three states have passed amendments to 
their constitutions which address victims‟ rights in one form or another. Negotiations are currently ongoing 
in the US to agree the final text of an amendment to the U.S. Constitution recognising the fundamental 
rights of crime victims to be treated with dignity, fairness and respect. See further http://www.nova.org. In 
the United Kingdom, the government has to date introduced two versions of the Victims’ Charter, which 
set out standards which victims should be able to expect from the authorities from the moment of entering 
the criminal process. The Government has recently issued fresh proposals regarding a new edition of the 
Victims‟ Charter, and has also raised the possibility of the appointment of a Victims‟ Ombudsman, as well 
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The implications of “victim emancipation” are widespread. It questions the very use of 
adversarial frameworks of justice, and extent to which attention to the rights of offenders 
ought to be protected. More recent debates contend that the victim / offender debate is not 
necessarily a zero sum game, and a number of areas can be highlighted where the 
interests of both victims and offenders coincide. However, at the end of the day, there 
will still be areas where some differentiation is necessary. 
 
This article aims to examine how this issue has been addressed developments on the 
international and transnational criminal justice platforms. It will begin by surveying 
recent standard-setting trends, and will analyse the formulation of victims‟ rights as a 
form of human rights. The main focus of the article will be to appraise recent 
jurisprudential trends in a number of regional and international tribunals, examining how 
such institutions have sought to define the interface between the rights of victims and 
defendants. It will focus primarily on the European Court of Human Rights, which has 
been the pro-active in the field. However, since such institutions appear to be 
increasingly willing to draw on standards and jurisprudence of other international fora, 
the picture given would be incomplete were the article to focus solely on the European 
Court. In conclusion, it is argued that while the notion of a minimum threshold of due 
process should continue to apply, it is argued that there is nonetheless substantial lee-way 
for the development of comprehensive standards in national, transnational and 
international criminal justice.  
 
 
II VICTIMS‟ RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 
At first glance, the relationship between human rights and victimology may appear an 
awkward one. Whereas human rights discourse has traditionally been perceived as liberal 
or left-wing and even apathetic towards victims of non-state crime, victimology has 
paradoxically been perceived as being a conservative or right-wing force, entrenched in 
                                                                                                                                                              
conferring further statutory rights on victims. See Home Office, A Review of the Victims’ Charter (2001: 
London, HMSO). 
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ideas of retributivism and vengeance. While a few activists in both camps may well fit in 
with these stereotypes, for the large part these perceptions are incorrect.  
  
In recent times it has become evident that the rights of victims of crime have developed 
in tandem: both through the parallel development of domestic and international criminal 
law frameworks alongside human rights discourse. This is in contrast with the initial 
post-war explosion of international human rights‟ instruments, which did not contain any 
specific measures relating to crime victims. A number of reasons can be suggested for 
this. First, at this time the criminal trial was widely viewed in both international and 
domestic law as a contest between the State and the alleged perpetrator.
2
 The crime 
victim was viewed as merely another witness to the State's case against the accused, with 
little or no consideration given to his or her interests, and there was little academic or 
policy interest in the concept of victimology.
3
 Secondly, whereas victims of abuse of 
power are in a direct vertical relationship with the State, victims of non-state crime are 
also in a horizontal relationship with another individual, which raises the problematic 
question of how the rights of crime victims can be said to fit into the traditionally vertical 
human rights equation. It is only in much more recent times that the jurisprudence of the 
international tribunals has attempted to address this question. 
 
With the discipline of victimology having grounded itself as a strong academic force, a 
number of studies and crime surveys suggested that the victim felt excluded and ill-
treated by the system which he or she had hoped would bring justice.
4
 In order to 
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 See further Christie, N., “Conflicts as Property” 23 Br J Criminology 289 (1977), where a  historical 
process is described whereby the State “appropriated” the victim / offender conflict from the hands of the 
individuals directly affected by the crime. 
3
 The academic study of the crime victim did not emerge until the 1940s, when Hans Von Hentig published 
The Criminal and his Victim (1948: New Haven, CT, Yale University Press). Here, a new direction was 
proposed for the criminal justice system, where the victim would play a much more active role. Only a 
handful of works were published in the early years, and these tended to concern themselves with victim 
precipitation and victim typologies. Substantial interest in the discipline did not take a foothold until the 
1970s. 
4
 See, for example, Sparks et al, Surveying Witnesses (1977: Chichester, John  Wiley), Maguire, “Victims‟ 
Needs and Victim Services: Indications from Research” (1985) 10 Victimology 539, Chambers and Millar, 
Investigating Sexual Assault (1983: Edinburgh, HMSO), British Crime Survey 1983, Shapland et al (1985), 
Shapland and Cohen, “Facilities for Victims: The Role of the Police and the Courts” [1987] Crim LR 28; 
Simon, “Improving Services for Victims in Magistrates‟ and Crown Courts – a Checklist for Good 
Practice” (1988) 151 JP 150 
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represent these concerns, a loose association of groups and individuals arose from a range 
of different backgrounds to contribute to increased discussion about role of the victim in 
the criminal justice system. These included feminists,
5
 childrens‟ rights campaigners,6 as 
well as specific victim-interest groups.
7
 Each of these groups was voicing active concerns 
about how each particular class of people were “victims” in one sense or another under 
the contemporary legal and political framework. The impact of such work upon 
government policy effected a series of widespread reforms during the 1980s in many 
criminal justice systems, as governments sought to respond to these concerns through the 
gradual implementation of varied victim-centred reforms. By the early 1990s, such 
reforms were widespread throughout the  western world,
8
 which in turn gave rise to the 
promulgation of victim-sensitive international standards and jurisprudential trends. It 
would appear that this trend is set to continue given current concerns surrounding 
international terrorism.
9
 
 
The interaction of different factors catapulted the victim unto the international stage at a 
time when both victimology and human rights law were mutually expanding and also 
converging. The shifting paradigms in human rights can be partly attributed to the 
                                                     
5
 Note, for example, the work of Erin Pizzey who established the first Rape Crisis Centre in the UK. The 
work of single-issue groups tended to focus primarily on the treatment of that particular victim or his / her 
family as well as the need to punish the offender and exclude him / her from society (Sarat, A "Vengeance, 
Victims and the Identitites of Law", (1997) 6(2) Social and Legal Studies 163). 
6
 During the late 1970s and 1980s, child protection had dramatically re-emerged in the public 
consciousness. In the UK between 1973 until 1999, there were been over 70 public or private inquiries into 
the deaths of abuse of children at the hands of parents, foster parents, residential care workers or others, see 
further Lyon, C, “The Definition of and Legal and Management Responses to the Problem of Child Abuse 
in England and Wales in Freeman, M (ed), Overcoming Child Abuse: A Window on a World Problem 
(2000: Aldershot, Ashgate). The abuse of children was highlighted in a number of cases, most notably in 
Cleveland (1986), and cases in which alleged satanic child abuse were uncovered in Orkney, Rochdale and 
Nottingham. Further cases indicated that social service staff themselves had been involved in this abuse in a 
number of children‟s homes in North Wales and Tyneside (1996). More recently, child pornography and 
particularly the exploitation of children on the internet has led to a massive media exposure of the problem, 
which has helped consolidate public attitudes and awareness on issues such as child abuse, and in relation 
to broader victimisation issues. 
7
 For example, groups campaigning for the registration of sex offenders, Incest Survivor Groups, relatives 
of murdered and missing children, relatives of victims of drunk driving, and those concerned with 
combating racism, homophobia and discrimination generally. 
8
 The nature of such reforms varied considerably, but all were designed to improve the satisfaction levels of 
victims going through the criminal process. They included the establishment of victim compensation 
schemes; protective measures such as the use of CCTV for the evidence of vulnerable witnesses in court; 
restrictions on cross-examination of sexual complainants and the piloting of restorative justice schemes. 
9
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breakdown of the public / private divide, which has forced human rights discourse to 
move beyond its traditional barriers, taking into account the ongoing changes to loci of 
power and the corresponding increase in opportunities afforded to individuals to utitlise 
formal complaints mechanisms. Likewise, victimology has undergone something of 
change. It has moved away from the typologies and stereo-typing of earlier way, towards 
a more integrated and holistic discourse taking into the numerous relationships in the 
criminal justice system between victims, offenders and the state, as well as the underlying 
importance of international human rights standards.
10
  
 
The effect of this convergence is that the inter-discplinary opportunities for cross-
fertilisation of ideas and approaches has vastly increased. Today, there is a fundamental 
and widespread recognition that the plight of crime victims has much in common with the 
plight of victims of state crime, or abuse of power. For example, with regard to the 
experiences of both “types” of victim, there are a number of striking similarities: they 
both suffer a similar emotional plights and psychological responses, such as self-blame 
and outrage; the impact of the offence on their lives may be similar, and both feel the 
need for some form of redress from the offender.
11
 Furthermore, victims, whether they 
are victims of crime or victims of abuse of power perpetuated by the state, are often 
subject to the same feelings of alienation and exclusion during any subsequent legal 
proceedings, often resulting in secondary victimisation in the courtroom. Physically, 
financially and psychologically, crime victims and victims of abuse of power have 
therefore much in common,
12
 which is being increasingly recognised in the drafting of 
international instruments. 
 
III. THE PROMULGATION OF VICTIM-SENSITIVE STANDARDS 
This parallel approach, reflected in many international instruments, has, in part, been due 
to the gradual reconstruction of crime as less of a legalistic offence against the state and 
                                                     
10
 See, for example, the works of Nagel, “The Notion of Victimology and Criminology” (1963) 3 Excerpta 
Criminologica 46 and Schafer, The Victim and His Criminal (1968:5). 
11
 Elias (1986:194) 
12
 Elias (1986:226) 
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more of a social offence against individuals and communities.
13
 Such thinking was 
reflected in the first significant set of standards dealing explicitly with crime victims, the 
UN Declaration of Basic Principles for Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power,
14
 which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1985. Its very name serves 
to illustrate the re-defining of victimhood as a concept which affected those who had 
been victimised by the state as well as by private individuals.
15
 The Declaration defined 
crime prevention as a victims‟ rights issue, and sought to guarantee access to justice and 
fair treatment, a right to information, assistance, and access to informal dispute resolution 
methods.
16
  
 
Many other international instruments require the interests of victims to be taken into 
account in a variety of different ways. These include the Basic Principles for the 
Treatment of Prisoners,
17
 UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and 
the Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures,
18
 and perhaps most notably 
the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice,
19
 which commits the member states:
20
  
“to introduce, where appropriate, national, regional and international action plans 
in support of victims of crime, such as mechanisms for mediation and restorative 
justice, and we establish 2002 as a target date for States to review their relevant 
practices, to develop further victim support services and awareness campaigns on 
the rights of victims and to consider the establishment of funds for victims, in 
addition to developing and implementing witness protection policies.” 
 
Paragraph 28 of the Declaration further commits the member states to implementing 
restorative justice policies that are “respectful of the rights, needs and interests of victims, 
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 res justice?? 
14
 UN Doc A/40/53 (1985). GA Res 40/43. The Declaration was originally prepared by the Seventh UN 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders held in Milan in 1985. 
15
 Roach, K (1999:284) 
16
 For example, the Declaration provides that the use of such mechanisms should ensure that the “outcome 
is at least as beneficial for the victims as would have been the case if the formal system had been used” 
(UN, 1985: A.7) 
17
 UN Doc A/45/49 (1990). GA Res 45/111. Principle 10 states “With the participation and the help of the 
community and social institutions, and with due regard to the interests of victims, favourable conditions 
shall be created for the reintegration of the prisoner into society…” 
18
 UN Doc A/45/49 (1990). GA Res 45/110. Rule 8(1) states “The judicial authority, having at its disposal a 
range of non-custodial measures, should take into consideration in making its decision the rehabilitative 
needs of the offender, the protection of society and the interests of the victim, who should be consulted 
whenever appropriate”. 
19
 Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the 21
st
 Century. (A/CONF.187/4). 
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offenders, communities and all other parties”. Shortly after this Declaration, the General 
Assembly adopted a resolution on the Draft Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative 
Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters. This resolution calls on the UN to distribute a 
draft set of Basic Principles prepared by the Working Party on Restorative Justice to 
governments and other interested organisations, and to convene an expert group to review 
those comments and suggests, and propose modifications or alternatives to the 
commission.
 21
 
 
Aside from UN instruments themselves, the Organisation was also responsible for 
formulating victim-sensitive rules in the Rules of Evidence and Procedure for the 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
22
 and more recently, and the Rome 
Statute for the International Criminal Court.  Since the very raison d’être of such 
institutions is to offer remedies and redress to the victims of human rights abuses, it 
would seem somewhat absurd if the procedural and evidential rules secured the suspect a 
fair trial without affording similar protections to alleged victims, for whom the 
experience of having to re-live traumatic events in a witness box under cross-examination 
is often downright frightening, and may be exacerbated given the fact that many of the 
alleged perpetrators may still be in positions of authority. Nonetheless, the evidential and 
procedural rules of such tribunals may hold valuable lesions for domestic courts because, 
unlike regional permanent human rights institutions such as the European Court of 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, these tribunals are 
directly concerned with the individual perpetrators of crimes, as opposed to the failure of 
states to abide by human rights norms. 
 
The Statute for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia acknowledges a 
relationship between the accused's right to a fair hearing alongside the need to protect 
victims and witnesses. While Article 20(l) of the Statute lays down a requirement that the 
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 At para 27. 
21
 Further measures for crime victims came in 1998, when a Proposal for the Foundation of an International 
Fund for Support to Victims of Transnational Crime was put before the General Assembly. This resolution 
was presented by the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to elaborate on the Economic 
and Social Council Resolution 1998/11 of 28 July 1998. 
22
 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia apply, mutatis mutandis, 
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trial be fair and expeditious, it also outlines that this should be done in such a way that 
proceedings are conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence, with 
full respect for the rights of the accused and “due regard for the protection of victims and 
witnesses”. The accused‟s right to a “fair and public hearing” is set out in Article 21(2), 
although it would seem that this is to be read in conjunction with Article 22, which 
requires the Tribunal to “provide in its rules of procedure and evidence for the protection 
of victims and witnesses.” It lists as examples the conduct of in camera proceedings and 
the use of other measures to protect the victim‟s identity. 
 
In relation to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence themselves, Rule 34 provides for the 
establishment of a Victim and Witnesses Unit. The functions of this Unit, under the Rule, 
are twofold: to recommend protective measures for victims and witnesses in accordance 
with Article 22 of the Statute; and provide counselling and support for them, particularly 
in cases of rape and sexual assault. The Rule also attempts to minimise the inevitable 
stress and fear felt by many sexual complainants by providing that due consideration be 
given, in the appointment of staff, to the employment of qualified women.
23
 
 
As with the tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia, the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court
24
 would seem to confirm the welcome fact that the interests 
of victims and witnesses are being in the process of being fully integrated into the 
international criminal justice agenda. For example, Article 38(2) of the Statute provides 
that the Trial Chamber shall ensure that the trial is fair and expeditious with full respect 
to the rights of the accused, whilst having “due regard” for the protection of victims and 
                                                                                                                                                              
to the Rwanda Tribunal (Art. 14 of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda). 
23
 The appointment of women to the staff of the Tribunal was particularly important as rapes were 
extremely common in the Yugoslav conflict –see further  Ni Aolainn, Radical Rules: The Effects of 
Evidential and Procedural Rules on the Regulation of Sexual Violence in War" (1997) 60 Albany Law 
Review 883; Catherine McKinnon (Finn, fn43); M Pratt and L E Fletcher, Time for Justice: The Case for 
International Prosecutions of Rape and Gender-Based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia (1994) 9 
Berkeley Women‟s Law Journal 77. The Rules are not limited to cases of rape, but refer generally to crimes 
of sexual assault. Special provisions are made relating to the required standard of proof, and matters 
relating to the credibility of the witness, which may be raised by the defence (rule 96). No corroboration of 
the victim's testimony is required in matters of sexual assault (Rule 91(1)), and the victim's previous sexual 
conduct is irrelevant and inadmissible (Rule 96(iv)). Furthermore, if a defence of consent is raised, the 
Tribunal may take note of factors that vitiate consent, including physical violence and moral or 
psychological constraints  (Rule 96(ii)). 
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witnesses. 
 
Following international trends, the Council of Europe has also been active in successfully 
integrating a victim agenda into criminal justice standards. Recommendation 85(11)
25
 
contained a variety of provisions relating to information, practical assistance and 
compensation,
26
 and this was followed by Recommendation (97)13,
27
 which provided for 
a range of measures for intimidated witnesses, including the opportunity to give evidence 
via alternative methods which protect them from “the intimidation of face-to-face 
confrontation” and the consideration by the court of the impact any intimidation may 
have on the evidence of a witness. Paragraph 25 pays particular attention to the plight of 
vulnerable witnesses, and states that wherever possible, vulnerable witnesses should be 
examined at the earliest stage of the criminal process and, where appropriate, provision 
should be made for pre-trial statements to be recorded by video in order to avoid the 
trauma which may accompany live face-to-face confrontation at the trial proper.
 28
 If such 
witnesses do have to testify, further provision is made for them in Paragraph 28, which 
provides: 
 
“At the court hearing, examination of the witness should be closely supervised by 
the judge. Where cross-examination, especially in cases concerning allegations of 
sexual offences, might have an unduly traumatic effect on the witness, the judge 
should consider taking appropriate steps to control the manner of questioning.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
24
 17 July 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9
th.
  
25
 Recommendation No. (85)11 on the Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and 
Procedure (1985). This followed on the heels of the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims 
of Violent Crime, which had been opened for signature in 1983, and provided that crime victims (or their 
dependants if the victim has died) who suffered serious injury or impairment of health directly attributable 
to an intentional crime of violence should be entitled to state compensation. 
26
 See, for example, paragraph A which provides that Police officers should be trained to deal with victims 
in a sympathetic, constructive and reassuring manner; The police should inform the victim about the 
possibilities of obtaining assistance, practical and legal advice, compensation from the offender and state 
compensation; The victim should be able to obtain information on the outcome of the police investigation; 
In any report to the prosecuting authorities, the police should give as clear and complete a statement as 
possible of the injuries and losses suffered by the victim. 
27
 Recommendation No. (97) 13 on the Intimidation of Witnesses and Rights of the Defence. 
28
 In relation to face-to-face confrontation between the accused and the victim, and the rights issues arising 
thereof, see Doak, J "Confrontation in the Courtroom: Shielding Vulnerable Witnesses from the 
Adversarial Showdown" (2000) 16(3) J Civ Lib 216.  
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This paragraph was distinctive from many other forms of human rights standards to date, 
which had habitually tended to be more concerned with operational standards in the 
criminal justice system than with evidential control during the trial itself. It was also 
different in so far as it alluded to the notion that a "fair trial" was not only limited to the 
accused, but that victim-witnesses were also deserving of some degree of special 
protection in criminal proceedings. It would seem that this notion represented something 
of a political precedent which is bound to impact on the future development of the 
Court‟s jurisprudence.29 
 
The impact of the victim agenda has also affected policy in the European Union. The 
Third Pillar of the European Union, Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal 
Matters, seems set to expand both in relation to its scope and enforceability as political 
harmonisation continues. In March 2001, the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted 
one of the most recent Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal 
Proceedings,
30
 which clearly endorses the idea that victim‟s rights should be viewed as a 
central pillar of criminal justice policy. Article 5 provides that “victims‟ needs should be 
considered and addressed in a comprehensive, co-ordinated manner, avoiding partial or 
inconsistent solutions which may give rise to secondary victimization.” Further 
provisions are made for the provision of information, protection from intimidation and 
compensation. In a similar vein, the European Parliament recently adopted a resolution 
concerning a Commission communication on Crime Victims in the European Union: 
Reflections on Standards and Action.
31
 This document contains 17 proposals grouped 
under five main headings: prevention of victimization; assistance to victims; standing of 
victims in the criminal procedure; compensation issues; and general issues (information, 
language, training), and calls on all member states to implement fair and effective 
legislation in these areas. 
 
                                                     
29
 See infra. 
30
 OJ 22/03/01, L 82/1. The document was an initiative of the Portuguese, during their Presidency of the 
European Union in 2000. It followed a request from European Council, which  at its meeting in Tampere 
1999 called for the drawing up of minimum standards on the protection of crime victims in the EU 
31
 COM (1999) 359. 
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The earlier standards which emanated from the UN and Europe tended to be primarily 
concerned with access to information and compensation for criminal injury, and as such 
were mostly service-based, as opposed to rights-based, in their nature.
32
 They were 
primarily concerned with practices and structures, as opposed to statutory protections 
concerning the giving of evidence or input into decision-making. These can be contrasted 
with more recent standards for example, those adopted by the UN in relation to the 
ICTFY and the ICC, which are much more comprehensive in their form.
33
  
 
 
IV. SPECIFIC AREAS OF PROTECTION 
 
The remainder of this article seeks to examine how the jurisprudence of international 
tribunals has sought to take account of the merging trends in criminal justice and human 
rights. It will concentrate primarily on the nature of the developing case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Not only is the Convention used widely in domestic 
adjudication, but it is the only regional tribunal to have developed a strong body of 
jurisprudence,. Also, as the oldest of all the instruments referred to in this article, it is 
noteworthy in so far as the case law clearly illustrates that older instrument can be 
advanced and developed by a pro-active judiciary in order to take account of changing 
international trends. Nonetheless, reference will be made where appropriate to the 
jurisprudence of other international tribunals, which may contain valuable lessons for the 
European Court and domestic systems on international best practice.  In all, there are 
three specific areas of protection can be identified where the Court has been active in 
integrating victims‟ interests into its jurisprudence, these being the effectiveness of the 
criminal investigation; witness anonymity and procedural issues arising within the trial 
itself. This section will then proceed to discuss what the future may hold for victims, and 
will note the potential for the further development of victim‟s rights, most notably in the 
fields of victim compensation and sentencing. 
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See further Williams, “The Victim‟s Charter: Citizens as Consumers of Criminal Justice Services” (1999) 
38 Howard J 384;  Zaubermen, R. “Victims as Consumers of the Criminal Justice System?” in A.Crawford 
and J.Goodey (eds), Integrating a Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice (2000: Aldershot, Ashgate), 
pp37-54. 
33
 For example,…. 
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(a) Criminal Investigation 
Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights enshrines the right to life. 
Widely regarded as one of the superior rights contained within the Convention, it is 
strictly non-derogable. The vast majority of cases brought under the article concern the 
use of lethal force by the state against its citizens, although the scope of the article is not 
confined the protection of life itself, but also of the right to life.
34
 As such, states must not 
only to refrain from taking life,
35
 but also to take steps to protect life against threats from 
third parties. Whilst the Court has made clear that states need not take extraordinary 
measures to protect the right to life of individuals,
36
 a number of decisions have made it 
very clear that the State ought to take preventative operational measures to protect 
individuals whose life is at risk from criminal acts of another individual. In Osman v 
United Kingdom,
37
 the applicants complained that the police had failed to take reasonable 
preventative measures with respect to the second applicant's former teacher who 
ultimately killed the first applicant's husband (the second applicant's father) and wounded 
the second applicant. Although the Court found no breach of Article 2 on the facts, it 
adopted a number of important principles relating to victims of crime. These included the 
extension of the state's obligation under Article 2 in circumstances where authorities 
failed to do all that could reasonably be expected of them to avoid a "real and immediate" 
risk to life, which they knew about or ought to have known about.
38
 The State was 
therefore under an obligation to take measures that reasonably might have been expected 
to minimise or avoid this risk and secure the article 2 rights of particular persons who are 
known to be at risk.
39
   
 
                                                     
34
 See Ni Aolain, F, The Politics of Force (2000: Belfast, Blackstaff), at 187. 
35
 Except in circumstances outlined in Article 2(2). The proviso does not, however, define instances where 
the state is permitted to intentionally kills an individual, but rather describes the situations in which it is 
permitted to use force, which incidentally may involve the taking of life. See, e.g. Ergi v Turkey (App No 
23818/94, judgment of the court, 28 July 1998). 
36
 X v Ireland (1970), 13 Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 792; 
37
 Decision of the Court, 28
th
 October 1998. 
38
 See paras 90 – 92. It was, however, found that the blanket immunity in UK law which restricted an 
individual to bring a claim in negligence against the police was unjustifiable, and this was held to constitute 
a breach of the right of access to a court under Article 6 
39
 See, for example, Kilic v Turkey. Here, a  journalist who had received death threats sought protection 
from the local Governor before his murder.  The Court upheld a complaint that the Turkish authorities had 
 13 
Likewise, the Court has also held that the state has a duty to take positive steps to protect 
article 3 rights through the protection of an effective criminal law. In A v UK,
40
 a 9-year-
old boy was beaten on the buttocks with a cane by his stepfather, which caused 
significant bruising. The stepfather‟s acquittal on the grounds of reasonable chastisement 
was held to breach the boy's Article 3 right to freedom from inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. The Court went on to state that it was not enough for a member 
state to make provision of a relevant criminal charge for criminal acts, but that the 
Convention also requires that the criminal law itself is effective in preventing such acts.   
 
The scope of article 2 has been widened still further by a series of recent cases, which 
make clear that the scope of positive obligations on the state is not limited to ensuring 
that rights under article 2 are not breached by other private individuals.  In McCann and 
others v United Kingdom, which concerned the killing of three IRA members in Gibraltar 
in 1988. It was held that the duty on the state was not confined to protecting the right  
life, but also required the establishment of procedures to investigate unlawful killings by 
the state. It can be assumed that this would extend to the investigation of killings by non-
state actors as well: 
“The obligation to protect the right to life under this provision, read in 
conjunction with the State's general duty under Article 1 (Art. 1) of the 
Convention to 'secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in [the] Convention', requires by implication that there should be some 
form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a 
result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State.” 41                 
 
 
In more recent cases the Court has gone still further, specifically pointing to elements of 
the investigation which should be in place in order to ensure that rights under articles 2 
and 3 are comprehensively protected. The investigation into the death of  an  alleged 
                                                                                                                                                              
failed to take reasonable measures available to them to prevent a real and immediate risk to life (para. 77) 
40
 (1999) 27 EHRR 611. 
41
 At para. 161. Likewise, in Cakici v Turkey, Decision of the Court, 8 July 1999 (App No 23657/94), the 
obligations under Article 2 were held to extend to situations where it was unclear that agents of the state 
were responsible for the death of the victim, an alleged member of the PKK, who was killed in suspicious 
circumstances in 1995.  See also the recent case of Jordan and others v UK, Decision of the Court, 4 May 
2001 (App 00024746/94),  where the Court held that there had been a violation of article 2 in the failure to 
conduct a proper investigation into the circumstances of killings in Northern Ireland. 
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PKK member by Turkish authorities was held to be wholly inadequate by the Court in 
Mahmut Kaya v Turkey.
42
 It was argued by the applicant, the brother of the deceased, that 
there was evidence to suggest state collusion in the killing and that the investigation into 
his death was fundamentally flawed. It appeared that no attempts were made to secure 
statements from the soldiers at the scene of the crime; no attempts were made to secure 
evidence that an exchange of shots took place; no forensic tests were carried out; and the 
autopsy report was deficient in a number of respects as to the precise cause of death. The 
Court held that such incidents “undermined the effectiveness of the criminal law” (para 
98), and highlighted the need for effective criminal law provisions to be in place  “to 
deter the commission of offences… backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the 
prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches” (at para 85).  
 
The Court has recently developed this line of jurisprudence even further. In a number of 
cases it has examined the combined effect of article 13, the right to a remedy, along with 
articles 2 and 3. In Aydin v Turkey,
43
 the Court stated:
44
 
  
“where an individual has an arguable claim that he has been tortured by agents of 
the State, the notion of an "effective remedy" entails, in addition to the payment 
of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective investigation 
capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible and 
including effective access for the complainant to the investigatory procedure.”  
 
The precise constituents of what exactly constitutes a “thorough and effective” 
investigation was recently examined by the Court in four joined cases taken against the 
United Kingdom by relatives of those killed by the security forces during the Northern 
Ireland conflict: Kelly and others v UK;
45
 Jordan v UK;
46
 Shanaghan v UK;
47
 and 
                                                     
42
 REF… The case is especially interesting as the complainant parties actually undertook their own private 
fact-finding process due to the flawed nature of the state inquest. 
43
 (1998) 25 EHRR 251. 
44
  Ibid, at para. 98. 
45
  (app no 30054/96). The case concerned an SAS ambush on the IRA at Loughgall, County Armagh in 
1987, when eight members of an IRA unit were killed on active service. 
46
 (app no 24746/94). Hugh Jordan  was the father of Pearse Jordan, an alleged IRA member who  was shot 
in Belfast in 1992 by the RUC. 
47
 (app no 37715/97). The case concerned allegations of collusion between the security forces and loyalist 
paramilitaries. Patrick Shanaghan, who the police believed to be in the IRA, was shot dead by a loyalist 
gunman in August 1991, following an incident which allegedly involved his police file falling out of an 
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McKerr v UK.
48
 In a strong indictment of Northern Ireland inquest and investigation 
procedures, the Court upheld the vast majority of the complaints which concerned severe 
shortcomings in a wide range of the investigatory procedures.  
 
While the Court emphasised that it was not prepared to investigate directly itself whether 
the perpetrators of the acts used unlawful or disproportionate force, it nonetheless 
highlighted the absolute necessity for procedural compliance with article 2. The Court 
ruled in all four cases that the UK had violated Article 2 of the Convention because it had 
not properly investigated the deaths in question: the investigations were deemed to be 
ineffective, lacking in transparency and impartiality. The specific issues raised by the 
complainants were varied, and most were subsequently upheld by the Court. Among the 
major criticisms to emerge from the judgments was the lack of independence in the police 
investigation;
49
 a lack of public scrutiny of the investigation and very limited access for 
relatives;
50
 security force witnesses were non-compellable to the inquests;
51
 the lack of 
legal aid for relatives;
52
 the lack of promptness and subsequent verdicts in the inquests;
53
 
the lack of prompt or effective investigation where there was evidence to suggest 
collusion;
54
 and the lack of public reasons given by the DPP for his failure to prosecute.
55
 
Although the failure to prosecute in itself was not criticised by the Court, but it would 
seem that on the basis of the abovementioned dictum of the Court in Aydin, that a failure 
                                                                                                                                                              
army vehicle. 
48
 (app 28883/95). Gervaise McKerr was killed in his car along with two other men in 1982 in an alleged 
shoot-to-kill incident involving RUC officers. Reportedly some 109 rounds were fired into the car. 
49
 See McKerr para 128, where the court noted the hierarchical link between those officers being 
investigated and those who were carrying out the investigation. See also Jordan, para 120; Kelly and 
others, para 114. 
50
 See Jordan para 134; Kelly and others, para 115, McKerr para 147; Note the Court statement in 
Shanaghan at para 105: “As regards the lack of public scrutiny of the police investigations, the Court 
considers that disclosure or publication of police reports and investigative materials may involve sensitive 
issues … and, therefore, cannot be regarded as an automatic requirement under Article 2. The requisite 
access of the public or the victim‟s relatives may be provided for in other stages of the available 
procedures.”  
51
 Jordan para 127; McKerr para 144; Kelly and others, para 121. 
52
 See Jordan, paras 137-138; McKerr para 146. 
53
 See Jordan para 120; McKerr para 148; Kelly and others, paras 128 and 130. 
54
 See Shanaghan (para 91) 
55
 The Court stated in Shanaghan, at para 107. “… Where no reasons are given in a controversial incident 
involving a killing, this may in itself not be conducive to public confidence. It also denies the family of the 
victim access to information about a matter of crucial importance to them and prevents any legal challenge 
of the decision.”  
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to prosecute persons against whom there was sufficient evidence that they had committed 
a crime would constitute an infringement of article 2.
56
 The Court also rejected an 
argument put forward by the state that the possibility of sufficient redress remained open 
to the families through civil actions for wrongful death. Following its previous decision 
in Kaya, it concluded that since the State had failed in its obligations of accountability, it 
would never be possible for the families of the victims to prove that the killings 
concerned were brought about by the State contrary to Article 2.  
 
While the vast majority of the case law in this field relates to “state” killings by security 
forces, the majority of the jurisprudence is also undoubtedly relevant to victims of non-
state crime.
57
 In summary therefore, as a result of the recent case law, the State is under 
an obligation to prevent crime, undertake a thorough investigation and, if warranted, 
should press charges. Further, victims or their families should be permitted access to the 
investigatory procedures; and should be given reasons for any decisions made in respect 
of a decision not to prosecute.  Indeed, article 2 may not only be limited to cases where 
there has been an actual loss of life: there would seem to be no reason why an individual 
could not rely on the provision in cases where life was endangered, even where no actual 
loss of life has occurred. The adequacy of the protection afforded by the criminal law 
would appear to constitute a key element of article 2 requirements, and failures of the 
                                                     
56
 The issue may have particular relevance to recent developments in Northern Ireland: the concerning the 
Omagh bomb. The relatives of the 29 people killed in the attack in  August 1998 have expressed 
considerable frustration over the lack of progress in the at police investigation, and have commenced civil 
actions against a number of individuals for wrongful death (Irish Times, 31 January 2002). It would appear 
that one of the main reasons for the fact that no successful prosecutions have been brought in Northern 
Ireland to date is that the police are anxious to protect the anonymity of informers. This highlights the 
delegate balance which the Court has to strike between upholding the rights to an effective investigation 
and charging suspects on the one hand, whilst in bearing in mind that this may risk endangering the article 
2 rights of others if a criminal prosecution where to proceed, along with jeopardizing the receipt of further 
information. See further the case of Rowe and Davis v United Kingdom  (2000) 30 EHRR 1. 
57
 For example, in the Jordan et al decision, while the dicta of the Court relating to the DPP‟s failure to 
give public reasons for his decisions and the limited access to the inquest for the relatives of the deceased 
would apply to both “types” of victim; other dicta are specific to inquests relating to state killings, for 
example, the hierarchical link between the investigating officers and those who were actually being 
investigated. It is worth noting that a number of questions nonetheless remain unanswered after Jordan et 
al, these being questions of degree – for example, there is no definition of what exactly constitutes a 
hierarchical relationship, the question of how independent ought such an investigation actually ought to be 
remains, as does a question over the degree of prima facie evidence required to substantiate evidence of 
collusion. 
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state to fully implement it and effect it will mean that they are likely to fall foul of 
Articles 2 or 3 ECHR.  
 
The expanding scope of the Convention to cover such cases of “indirect responsibility” 
would seem to be in line a broader trend in international human rights law generally, as 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights declared in Valasquez Rodriguez v 
Honduras:
58
  
“The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights 
violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation 
of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to 
impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate 
compensation.  
The duty to prevent includes all those means of a legal, political, administrative 
and cultural nature that promote the protection of human rights and ensure that 
any violations are considered and treated as illegal acts, which, as such, may lead 
to punishment of those responsible and the obligation to indemnify the victims for 
damages.”59  
 
The Court continued, suggesting that a heavy onus falls on the contracting state to 
disprove any breach of the right to life:   
 
"Where the acts of private parties ... are not seriously investigated, those parties 
are aided in a sense by the government, thereby making the State responsible on 
the international plane".
60
   
 
The collapse of the vertical / horizontal divide has opened the door for victims of non-
state crime to have their interests protected under articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. 
While it is therefore clear that international human rights instruments place states under 
an obligation to protect rights in both the vertical and horizontal senses, although what is 
not yet clear are the boundaries of this duty. Evidently the state cannot be held 
responsible for every infringement of the criminal law. The Court indicated in HLR v 
                                                     
58
 Valasquez Rodriguez v Honduras, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C, No 4, Judgement of 
29 July 1988, (1989) 28 ILM 291. 
59
 Ibid., at paras. 174-175. 
60
 Ibid.,  176-77  
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France
61
 that the obligation exists only where it is shown that “the risk [of breach] is real 
and that the authorities ... are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate 
protection”,62 although it would seem probable that a broad margin of appreciation may 
exist to allow member states some lee-way in determining how to protect the rights of 
individuals against the infringements of private persons.
63
 Clearly fresh minimal 
requirements have been laid down by the Court of late; but it remains to be seen how far 
the Court will be prepared to develop the notion of indirect responsibility for breaches of 
articles 2 and 3. 
 
(b) Anonymity 
Witness intimidation has become a major issue for criminal justice agencies in recent 
years. While there is little empirical evidence to illustrate how widespread or serious the 
problem is, many jurisdictions have to address the issue in a variety of ways in order to 
maintain public confidence in the criminal process. The admission into evidence of 
written statements in place of oral testimony, and the use of special measures such as 
screens or television links, or the clearing the public gallery may be used to shield a 
witness from the view of the public and / or the accused.  
 
A much more contentious method of dealing with the problem has been conferring the 
power on courts to grant anonymity to prosecution witnesses who claim they have been 
intimidated or are fearful about the consequences of testifying. Traditionally, in common 
law jurisdictions, it has been widely accepted that judges or magistrates do not have a 
discretionary power to grant anonymity to witnesses,
64
 the principle of orality is regarded 
as a fundamental tenet of the adversary system.
65
 However, it is submitted that such a 
view is derived directly from the now oft criticised orthodox perception of the criminal 
trial as a contest between the state and the accused, which has failed to take into account 
                                                     
61
 (1997) 26 EHRR 29. 
62
 At para 40. 
63
 See Z and others v United Kingdom (Judgment of the Court, 10 May 2001, Application No. 29392/95) 
64
 See Re Socialist Worker Printers and Publishers Ltd, ex p Attorney General [1975] QB 637. 
65
 Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417.  In the USA, the "right to confrontation" is regarded as sacrosanct and is 
enshrined as the Sixth Amendment of the Consitution. See, for example, California -v- Green 399 US 149 
at 157 (1970)., where the Court held that the “literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of trial” 
formed “the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.”  
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the wider interests of other parties to the trial and indeed society at large. Consequently, 
many common law jurisdictions do now make provision for the screening of  the witness' 
identity either from the public,
66
 the accused, or both. The common law position can be 
contrasted with that of a number of civil law jurisdictions, most notably the 
Netherlands,
67
 where due to the inquisitorial nature of proceedings, there has traditionally 
been much less of an issue with regard to courts receiving the evidence of anonymous 
witnesses where their lives may be placed in danger as a result of giving testimony. Many 
number of human rights commentators and NGOs have subsequently expressed fears that 
that anonymity orders endanger the fair administration of justice, the due process rights 
of the accused, as well as the age-old legal maxim that justice must not only be done, but 
must be seen to be done.
 68
 
 
This is a classic scenario of a conflict between the interests and rights of parties to 
proceedings. It is not in the accused‟s interests to have a witness testify against him if his 
counsel cannot effectively challenge the reliability of the witness‟s testimony: this would 
appear to contravene the right of the accused to challenge effectively evidence adduced 
against him. Yet, if a witness fears for his safety or life, it would seem that international 
norms, as discussed supra, now require that the state should take whatever proactive steps 
are necessary in order to protect such witnesses. The liability of the state for ensuring the 
safety of witnesses is also echoed in a number of soft law standards, most notably Article 
13 of the Convention Against Torture which states: 
 
“Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he has been 
subjected to torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has the right to complain 
                                                     
66
 See, for example, s442(3) Canadian Criminal Code, Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act (Queensland) 
2000, and in relation to the UK, see ss44-47 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, and note the 
guidelines given by the Court of Appeal on the “rare and exceptional circumstances” where the identity of 
the accuser could be witheld from the accused in R v Taylor [1994] TLR 484. 
67
 See s264 Witness Protection Act. For further details on the position of the victim in the Dutch criminal 
process, see L Ellison, The Adversarial Process and the Vulnerable Witness (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), Chapter 7.  
68
 See, for example, Costigan, R and Thomas, P, “Anonymous Witnesses” (2000) 51(2) Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly 326; Amnesty International, “Fairness to Defendants at the International Criminal Court: 
Proposals to Strengthen the Draft Statute and its Protection of Defendant's Rights” (1996) Volume 1, 
Number 2 International Criminal Court Briefing Series.  
46 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Colombia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.84, Doc. 39 rev., 14 October 1993, p. 98.  
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to, and to have his case promptly and impartially examined by, its competent 
authorities. Steps shall be taken to ensure that the complainant and witnesses are 
protected against all ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of his 
complaint or any evidence given.” 
 
The European Court has not ruled against the use of anonymity orders, and the 
jurisprudence suggests that providing there are counter balancing measures in place which 
allow the evidence to be challenged  by the accused or his lawyers, then it will not 
normally contravene Article 6 of the Convention.
69
 In Kostovski v The Netherlands,
70
 the 
counter measures in place were found to be wholly inadequate. Here, the anonymous 
evidence was presented at the criminal trial in hearsay form, with the defence only 
permitted to submit written questions to the magistrate‟s hearing, and the only the 
magistrate was available at the trial proper for questioning. The Court found no breach of 
Article 6 in either Baegen v Netherlands
71
 or Doorson v Netherlands,
72
 where anonymous 
witnesses were used in both cases, but more stringent counter measures were clearly 
available. In Doorson, for example, the Court pointed out that defence counsel was 
permitted to attend the magistrates‟ hearing and put questions to the anonymous witnesses 
through the magistrates. Consequently, the Court held that such procedures did not 
contravene Article 6, although significantly the Court also highlighted the fact that the 
conviction in this case was not based solely or to a decisive extent on the anonymous 
evidence.
73
 
 
                                                     
69
 See, for example, Unterpringer v Austria (1986) 13 EHRR 175 at para 31; Kostovski v Netherlands 
(1989) 12 EHRR 434 at para 41. 
70
 (1989) 12 EHRR 434. 
71
 27 October 1995, Series A, No. 327-B. 
72
 26 March 1996, RJC, 1996-II, No6. 
73
 It is also worth noting that the need for such steps is not limited to protect the identities “victim-
witnesses”, but it would seem that similar protections would have to be put in place for other witnesses in 
criminal proceedings, including the alleged perpetrator(s). See also the decision in R v Lord Saville of 
Newdigate, ex p A [1999] 4 All ER 860, which highlights the particular difficulties courts and tribunals can 
face where witness anonymity is raised as an issue for state witnesses in the context of public inquiries. 
Here, the Court of Appeal held that the Bloody Sunday Tribunal had acted unlawfully in refusing 
anonymity requests from soldier-witnesses at the Bloody Sunday tribunal. The Court required cogent 
justification for the interference with a fundamental right such as the right to life, and was further willing to 
take into account  the weight given to specific factors. The decision, however, was widely condemned by 
the families of the victims of Bloody Sunday and their representatives, on the basis that the Court reached 
its conclusions not on the basis of objective scrutiny, but rather on the basis of reports prepared by the 
military. See further Costigan, R and Thomas, P, “Anonymous Witnesses” (2000) 51(2) Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly 326, at 335-342. 
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In summary, the use of anonymous witnesses should not contravene the European 
Convention providing such measures are strictly necessary,
74
 and that any conviction is 
not based either solely or to a decisive extent on the evidence of an anonymous witness.
75
 
Both these issues surfaced recently before the Court in the case of Visser v Netherlands.
76
 
The applicant complained that he had not been afforded a fair trial since he had been 
denied the right to test the evidence against him under Article 6(3)(d). Neither he nor his 
counsel had been given the opportunity to see the anonymous witness, and had thus been 
unable to observe his demeanour under cross-examination. However, more than five 
years had passed since the witness first gave a statement to the police, while the 
applicant‟s co-accused, whom the witness was purported to fear, had been released from 
prison in 1988, and the Court found that he had given to cause for anyone to believe that 
they might be targeted by him. Furthermore, the Court found that  the conviction was 
based primarily on the evidence of the anonymous witness, thus contravening the 
principles set out in Van Mechelen. 
 
The potential for conflict on this particular issue has also been highlighted by the decision 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY), Prosecutor v 
Tadic,
77
and the subsequent academic debate. The Rules of the ICTFY contain a number 
of very specific protections in relation to arrangements that may be made to protect the 
identity of witnesses. Rule 75 provides that a Judge or a Chamber may, of its own motion 
or at the request of either party or of the witness him / herself, order appropriate measures 
for the privacy and protection of certain witnesses, providing such measures do not 
                                                     
74
 See Van Mechelen and others v The Netherlands (1997) 25 EHRR 647, a drug-related case involving an 
anonymous police officers. Their evidence had been recorded by a judge who knew their identities, and 
who had made a written report concerning their credibility and reliability. At trial the defence was given 
full access to cross-examine the officers, although they were seated in a separate room connected by a 
sound link to the court. The European Court held that the accused had not had a fair trial, since they were 
unaware of the identity of the witnesses, were deprived of the opportunity of observing their demeanour, 
and the judge‟s report as to their credibility was not sufficient to overcome the problems of not being able 
to observe their demeanour themselves. It was also highlighted by the court that efforts should have been 
made to ascertain whether there had been an actual threat made, and further emphasised that while police 
officers were also entitled to Article 2 protections, their professional duties mean that their position is 
different to that of a disinterested witness since they owe a general duty of obedience to the state‟s 
executive, and usually have links with the prosecution.  
75
 Doorson , 26 March 1996, RJC, 1996-II, No6. 
76
 (app no 26668/95) 
77
 (1996) 35 ILM 32. 
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impugn the rights of the accused.
78
 Furthermore, Rule 69 provides that the identities of 
witnesses who may be at risk should not be disclosed to the accused until such time as the 
witness can be brought under the protection of the Tribunal (subject to Rule 75); and 
Rule 79 provides that in “exceptional circumstances” the prosecution and the defence are 
permitted to submit evidence by way of deposition, for witnesses who are unable or 
unwilling to testify subsequently in open court.
79
 
  
In Tadic, the Prosecutor‟s office had filed a motion seeking protective measures for a 
number of witnesses, including confidentiality and anonymity. The defence rejected the 
requests for anonymity on grounds that this would infringe the right of the accused to 
know the identity of his or her accuser. The Prosecutor's motion sought several different 
types of protective measures. The two principal categories of measures were those 
designed to: (i) keep certain witnesses' names and identifying data confidential vis-à-vis 
the public, but allow their release to the Defence; and (ii) keep other witnesses 
anonymous so that neither the defence nor the public could learn their identity. With 
respect to the first category of measures, which the Trial Chamber classed as 
“confidentiality measures”, the Chamber noted that while the preference would normally 
be for a public hearing, this requirement had to be “balanced with other mandated 
interests, such as the duty to protect victims and witnesses”, and concluded that the 
measures proposed in the motion would not violate the accused's right to a public hearing 
as enshrined in Article 21(2) of the Tribunal's Statute. 
 
More problematic for the Chamber was the Prosecutor‟s request for anonymity for certain 
witnesses. Whilst working from the premise that all evidence ought to be produced in the 
                                                     
78
 A Chamber may thus hold a voir dire hearing  in order to determine which measures may be necessary in 
this regard. Examples may include expunging names and identifying information from the Chamber‟s 
public records; non-disclosure of certain information to the public; use of image / voice altering devices or 
CCTV, and the assignment of a pseudonym. See Shaw, M “The International Criminal Court – Some 
Procedural and Evidential Issues” (1998) 3(1) Journal of Armed Conflict Law 65 at 88. 
79
 Depositions may be taken by means of video-conference if appropriate (rule 71). In order to 
protect the "equality of arms" and  the rights of the accused, this procedure also allows for taking 
depositions allows for cross-examination of the witness. 
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presence of the accused at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument, it 
nevertheless went on to advocate an interest-balancing approach in stating:
80
 
 
“... the interest in the ability of the defendant to establish facts must be 
weighed against the interest in the anonymity of the witness. The balancing of 
these interests is inherent in the  notion of a 'fair trial'. A fair trial means not 
only fair treatment to the defendant but also to the prosecution and to the 
witnesses.” 
 
The Chamber proceeded to note that the right of cross-examination could only be 
restricted in exceptional circumstances, but nevertheless concluded that the situation of 
armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia constituted “exceptional circumstances par 
excellence”, which would warrant departure from the normal procedural guarantees. 
 
In order to determine whether anonymity should be granted in a particular instance, the 
Chamber identified  five criteria that were “relevant to the balancing of all interests”:- 
 
(1) the existence of a real fear for  the safety of the witness or the witness's 
family; 
(2) the testimony must be sufficiently relevant and important to the Prosecutor's 
case to make it unfair to compel him to proceed without it; 
(3) there must be no prima facie evidence that the witness is untrustworthy;  
(4) there is no effective protection programme for the witness or  the witness's 
family; and  
(5) the measures taken should be strictly necessary.  
 
In assessing each of these factors, the Court found that the specific requests of the 
Prosecutor met these criteria, and the Chamber granted the request for anonymity for 
certain witnesses and ordered more limited protective measures for others. The Chamber 
also held that witness anonymity did not violate the right of the accused to examine, or 
have examined, witnesses against him, although at the same time acknowledging that the 
Chamber had restricted the rights of the defence.  
                                                     
80
 Paras 54-55. 
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In dissent, Judge Stephen took issue with the majority opinion with respect to anonymity, 
whilst agreeing with the majority‟s decision on other protective measures. He pointed to 
the language of Article 20(1), which demands “full respect”' for the rights of the accused 
and requires only “due regard” for the protection of victims and witnesses. He argued that 
only the “public hearing” limb of Article 21(2) was subject to Article 22 and not its “fair 
hearing” limb, and concluded that the use of anonymous witnesses could not be 
reconciled with the requirement of a fair hearing for the accused provided for in the 
Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The view of Judge Stephen was 
expressly agreed with by a Chamber of three different judges in  Prosecutor v Blaštic,81 
although the Chamber did not rule out the use of anonymous witnesses in the trial per se. 
It approved of the five guidelines laid down in Tadic, but appeared to support a more 
restrictive interpretation of them, particularly in relation to what might constitute 
“exceptional circumstances”.82 
 
A number of commentators, most notably, Monroe Leigh, have agreed with the 
dissenting judgment of Judge Stephen in Tadic.
83
 It is argued however that the majority 
opinion was the better one, which sought to balance the safety and well-being of victims 
and witnesses alongside the accused‟s right to a fair hearing. Judge Stephen's view has 
been criticised particularly by Momeni, who accuses him of overlooking “the crucial role 
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 Blaštic case, 5 November 1996, IT-95-14-T. 
82
 In this case,  the  Chamber found such “exceptional circumstances”  because the accused had been a 
senior officer in the HVO army, and had been charged with culpability for serious war crimes committed 
by personnel under his command. Furthermore, the Chamber highlighted the fact that the Prosecutor was 
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 See the debate between Christine Chinkin and Monroe Leigh in vols 90 / 91 of the American Journal of 
International Law. Whereas Chinkin supported the majority ruling on the basis that “the requriements of a 
fair trial cannot be made in the abstract”, and on the basis that the rights contained in Article 21 were 
subject to those contained in Article 22, Leigh rejects this analysis and argues that the minimum standards 
for the accused are not textually qualified by Article 22. He also submits that “international law has not yet 
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provide anonymity to victims and witnesses. See also Geoffery Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity 
(1999: London, Penguin), pp 290-292. 
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that eyewitnesses would play in the prosecution of the indicted…most of whom still live 
in volatile areas and have a reasonable fear of retaliation”.84 
 
Momeni's criticism would appear to be valid. Rape is a unique crime in that it is a very 
personal violation carrying long-term detrimental effects upon the survivor‟s life.85 Many 
women who were raped in the Former Yugoslavia came from Muslim communities 
where sexual matters are not discussed openly, and certainly not in front of a public 
courtroom full of males. In such areas, virginity is often perceived as a pre-requisite for 
marriage, thus leaving many rape victims feeling excluded and rejected within their own 
communities.
86
 Non-disclosure of victims‟ names and addresses protects victims from the 
glare of the public as well as from the risk of reprisal attacks on return to their own 
community, while at the same time encouraging them to report offences that might 
otherwise never come to light.
87
 
 
The Tribunal is not an ordinary criminal justice institution: there is no witness protection 
programme in place for those who testify. Indeed, since victims of such crimes have a 
duty to give evidence to the Tribunal, there is a wider public interest to be served in 
ensuring that those charged with crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia are 
tried by the international community to uphold international peace and security. Thus the 
rights of the accused to a fair hearing need to be balanced alongside the private interests 
of the individual victim-witness, as well as the broader public interest in ensuring that all 
crime is effectively punished. 
 
It is submitted that the anonymity of certain witnesses, in the exceptional circumstances 
such as those which existed within the former Yugoslavia, would be justifiable under 
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international human rights law, which contains no absolute requirement that the accused 
must know the identity of his accuser.
88
 Undoubtedly it would seem to exist as a 
fundamental right in most “normal” criminal trials, but there are, and must, be exceptions 
to this principle. A fair trial does not mean a trial which is free from all possible 
detriment or disadvantage to the accused. As Spencer argues: 
 
“The law is bound to recognise at least some exceptional cases where the courts 
can hear the evidence of absent witnesses, because if it did not, criminal justice 
would be paralysed in the face of some most dangerous criminals.”89 
 
The Rome Statute has unfortunately fudged the issue of witness anonymity. While 
Article 68 states that the ICC must take “appropriate measures to protect the safety, 
physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses”, 
Article 69(2) provides that such measures  “shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with 
the rights of the accused.” Geoffery Robertson contends that this formula “should ensure 
that the correct dissenting opinion of Sir Ninian Stephen in the Tadic case is adopted by 
the ICC”, yet it could equally be argued that the formula is left open and would not 
prevent the ICC from following the majority decision in Tadic, since the right to know 
the identity of one‟s accuser is not an absolute right in international human rights law. 
 
On the basis of recent trends, it would thus appear that the right of an accused to know 
the identity of his or her accuser will not normally be regarded as an absolutely necessary 
element within the criminal trial. As the European Court has observed on a number of 
occasions, breaches of the right to a fair trial are less likely to be found on the basis of 
evidential or procedural rules, but the Court will instead look at the trial process as a 
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whole in order to ascertain whether the fundamental aspects of fairness have been 
observed.
90
 
 
(c) Trial Issues 
Closely linked to witness anonymity is the issue of privacy. Just as in many cases, for one 
reason or another, it would pose a danger to life or safety of witnesses to release their 
names, it is submitted that certain aspects of the witness‟s life ought to be withheld from 
the public in order to protect their right to privacy. The protection of individual privacy 
(or the lack of it), is just one element of a broader problem which causes considerable 
anxiety for victims attending court. Cross-examination itself can be a traumatic and 
frightening ordeal . In trials for rape or sexual assault, complainants are frequently 
subjected to a degrading and detailed cross-examination on intimate details of their 
private lives in order to destroy the character of the complainant. Details of clothing, 
underwear, menstrual cycles, and previous sexual encounters have frequently been 
dredged up before the court,
91
 and in most cases, complainants will have little option 
other than to respond to the questions put to them.
92
  
 
While no test on the matter has yet come before the European Court, it would seem that 
complainants who are subjected to this form of treatment may potentially find refuge 
either under Article 3, if they feel the state has failed to prevent them from being treated 
in a degrading manner, and / or under article 8 if they feel the state has failed to protect 
their right to privacy. 
 
Article 3 states that “no one shall be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”.  While all the case law to date seems to have centred around allegations of some 
form of physical abuse or maltreatment, there seems to be no reason to preclude psychological 
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abuse from the scope of this Article. As with article 2, the scope of the provision is not limited to 
redressing incidences of alleged torture / degrading treatment carried out by the state, but also 
applies in situations where states have not taken adequate steps to prevent the interference from 
occurring, whether the torture or degarding treatment was directly caused by the state party 
itself,
93
 or by a third party.
94
 If, for example, a rape complainant felt that, as a result of being 
harassed psychologically in the witness box, he or she experienced some form of post-traumatic 
stress, it is conceivable that a complaint could be brought against the state for a breach of article 
3, since the state‟s failure to provide protection mechanisms for the complainant at the trial could 
be directly attributed to the treatment which he or she suffered in the witness stand. On a number 
of rare occasions, the nature of this ordeal has been greatly exacerbated through rape defendants 
representing themselves and subjecting their victims to hostile and prolonged cross-
examinations.
95
 A number of jurisdictions have now taken statutory measures to prevent this, by 
providing for mandatory representation or some form of “judicial filtering” either for the entire 
trial or for the time when the complainant is giving evidence.
96
 While there has been no case 
directly on point, the jurisprudence to date would seem to indicate that such requirements would 
be very unlikely to violate the rights of the accused under Article 6 as the case law indicates there 
is no absolute right to access or a lawyer of one‟s own choice.
97
 
  
It has long been recognised that victims‟ dignity and privacy risk being violated in the 
course of the criminal trial. Principle 4 of the UN Declaration on Victims underlines the 
fact that "victims should be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity", and 
                                                     
93
 See Cyprus v Turkey (1976) 4 EHRR 482, where the Commission found Turkey to be breach of Article 3 
for rapes committed by its soldiers. It held that Turkey had not done enough to prevent such attacks and 
that the disciplinary measures which followed after the attacks were insufficient. 
94
 See, for example,  Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439, where the Court considered that the 
extradition of the applicant to the USA to face trial for murder and possibly the death penalty could amount 
to a violation of Article.3, and D v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423, where the Court considered the 
deportation of the applicant who had AIDS to a country who did not have facilities to treat his condition a 
breach of Article 3 requirements. 
95
 For example, in the UK there was a widespread media outcry following the horrific ordeals of two rape 
victims who were subjected to prolonged and intimate cross-examinations by their respective alleged 
attackers, Milton Brown and Ralston Edwards. See, e.g., The Times, 7 May 1998, "Judges told to end trial 
ordeal of rape victims", The Times, April 5, 2000, "Law change after 'horrifying' cases"; Daily Mail, 9 June 
2000 "Power to put a stop to 'torture' on the stand". 
96
 For example, this was one of the many reforms introduced to improve the lot of vulnerable witnesses in 
England and Wales under ss34-37.  
97
 See Philis v Greence (1991) 13 EHRR 741 and Croissant v Germany (1992) 16 EHRR 135. There would 
seem to be no absolute right for an accused to access a lawyer of his own choosing. 
 29 
Principle 6(d) provides that the judicial system should take "measures to minimize 
inconvenience to victims, protect their privacy, when necessary, and ensure their  
safety, as well as that of their families and witnesses on their behalf, from intimidation 
and retaliation". 
 
 In relation to Article 8, which protects the right to privacy and family life, the European 
Court has also held that the state has  a positive obligation to take measures  to protect the 
right to privacy, in both a verticle and horizontal sense, as the Court outlined in X and Y v 
Netherlands. Y, a minor, was sexually abused while in residential care. Due to the fact 
she had been declared mentally ill, she was unable to file a complaint under Dutch law, 
and her father also failed to meet the statutory criteria which would have permitted him to 
file a complaint as her parent. The Court rejected the State‟s defence that an appropriate 
remedy would have been available to the complainant through a civil action, and held 
that the state was under a positive duty to provide legal mechanisms to protect the 
privacy of the applicant's daughter: 
 
"The Court recalls that although the object of Article 8 (art. 8) is essentially that 
of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public 
authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: 
in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive 
obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life."
98
  
 
Although arising through a very different context, Z v Finland,
99
 provides an illustration 
of a case where the rights and interests of the innocent party had to be weighed not 
against the right of a defendant to a fair trial, but against the public interest in a criminal 
prosecution. The case concerned the disclosure of confidential medical records, which is 
common place in rape trials and constitutes a grave intrusion of privacy. The applicant 
had been married to a man who was being tried on several counts of manslaughter on the 
grounds that he had knowingly engaged in sexual acts with others knowing that he was 
HIV positive. When her former husband refused to give evidence himself, the authorities 
seized the applicant‟s medical records and ordered her medical advisor to give evidence 
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at the trial to establish the date when the applicant knew he was HIV positive. The 
accused was convicted, but the court ordered that the judgment remain confidential for a 
ten year period to protect the identity of the applicant. In a cruel and somewhat ironic 
twist, the Finnish Court of Appeal upheld the ten year confidentiality order, but 
unintentionally disclosed the applicant‟s name and medical condition in the appeal 
judgment, which it had faxed to the press.  
 
Before the Court, the Finnish authorities accepted that Article 8 had been breached, but 
contended that the measures were “necessary in a democratic society” to prevent crime 
and to protect the rights of others. The Court agreed that the public interest in the 
investigation and prosecution of crime and the public interest in the publicity of court 
proceedings can outweigh medical confidentiality, but only in limited circumstances and 
where safeguards exist to protect the rights of patients. The Court found no violation of 
Article 8 in relation to the seizure of the applicant‟s medical files and the order 
compelling her advisors to give evidence, but did find a violation in relation to the ten 
year confidentiality order, which the Court felt was too short, and through the (albeit 
unintentional) disclosure of the applicant‟s name in the Court of Appeal judgment. 
However, had the balancing exercise been with the accused‟s fair trial rights under 
Article 6 as opposed to the public interest in prosecution, a more delicate rights-balancing 
exercise may have had to have been undertaken by the Court. 
 
Attaching substantive rights to complainants and other third parties in this manner will 
mean that, in certain cases, these rights will have to be balanced against the rights of the 
accused, whose fair trial rights are contained in Article 6 of the Convention. The wording 
of the Article itself states that it will only apply to the accused “in the determination of a 
criminal charge against him…”, which means that a victim / witness will not be entitled 
to bring an action under the provision in their own right, but it is nevertheless clear from 
Doorson  that the Court must nevertheless undertake an interest-balancing exercise when 
determining whether the accused's rights have been breached: 
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“ It is true that Article 6 does not explicitly require the interests of witnesses in 
general, and those of victims called upon to testify in particular, to be taken into 
consideration.  However, their life, liberty or security of person may be at stake, 
as may interests coming generally within the ambit of Article 8 of the 
Convention...  Contracting States should organise their criminal proceedings in 
such a way that those interests are not unjustifiably imperilled.  Against this 
background, principles of fair trial also require that in appropriate cases the 
interests of the defence are balanced against those of witnesses or victims called 
upon to testify.”100 
 
Contrary to popular opinion, this does not imply a dilution of the protections afforded to 
the accused. In Van Mechelen -v- Netherlands,
101
 it was held that any measures 
restricting the rights of the defence should be strictly necessary, and if a less restrictive 
measure can suffice, then it is that measure which should be applied.
102
 The idea that 
defence rights are somehow subject to the rights of the victim is clearly wrong, but so too 
is the notion that the victim is not worthy of basic minimum standards of protection 
within the criminal process.  
 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has also emphasised the 
importance of balancing the rights of the defence and the interest of third parties. Article 
43 of the ILC draft statute requires the trial chamber to “take all necessary measures 
available to it, to protect the accused, victims and witnesses, and may to that end conduct 
closed proceedings or allow the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special 
means,” and Article 38(4) provides that such proceedings may be held in camera for the 
purpose of protecting confidential or sensitive information which is to be given in 
evidence. 
 
Indeed, the use of such “special means” are becoming increasingly available in criminal 
trials in many jurisdictions involving child witnesses, rape complainants and witnesses 
who are fearful about the consequences of testifying. In X v UK,
103
 the Court found no 
breach of Article 6 where screens were employed by the court to shield witnesses from 
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public view in a case concerning a terrorist murder in Northern Ireland. Although they 
could not be seen by the defendant or public, the witnesses were in full view of the judge 
and both prosecution and defence counsel, they could be heard by everyone and their 
evidence did not involve the identification of the applicant, which was the main issue in 
the trial.
104
 Indeed, the provision of such protection is not limited to the European 
Convention. Provision for such measures can also be found in the Rome Statute, which  
affirms that evidence may be given through “electronic or other special means”, 
particularly in cases of sexual violence against children, where it is presumed that the 
child will give evidence in such a way unless the Court directs otherwise.
105
 
 
 
 
 
                               
V. SCOPE FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS  
While there have been a number of very progressive developments in recent years, it is 
hoped that the jurisprudence of the Convention can be developed yet further, and two 
areas in which such progress may occur are in the fields of victim compensation and 
sentencing. In relation to victim compensation, international soft law standards contain a 
plethora of norms which aim to ensure that victims and their families should be able to 
obtain redress in the form of restitution or compensation.
106
 In particular, the European 
Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes requires signatories to 
ensure compensation for “those who have sustained serious bodily injury or impairment 
of health directly attributable to an intentional crime of violence… or the dependants of 
persons who have died as a result of such crime”. Provision was also made for victim 
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compensation under the Rules of Evidence and Procedure for the Former Yugoslavia to 
facilitate compensation for victims through nationals courts,
107
 and under Article 75 of 
the Rome Statute also states that the ICC shall establish principles relating to reparations 
victims. 
 
Shelton - The United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of 
Crime and Abuse of Power 1 contains broad guarantees for those who suffer pecuniary 
losses, physical or mental harm, and "substantial impairment of their fundamental rights" 
through acts or omissions, including abuse of power. Victims are entitled to redress and 
to be informed of their right to seek redress. The Declaration specifically provides that 
victims of public officials or other agents who, acting in an official or quasi-official 
capacity, violate national criminal law, should receive restitution from the state whose 
officials or agents are responsible for the harm inflicted. 
 
However, under the ECHR, there also is no requirement for a member state to 
compensate for criminal injuries caused by another individual. The Court has held that 
neither Articles 3 nor 8 will apply. Article 6 would not be an option since the victim is 
not regarded as a party to the criminal trial, although one option might be for him or her 
to rely on Article 6(1) in their own right and claim they have been precluded from access 
to a court, although the fact that a civil remedy for damages would normally be available 
in domestic law, this too would be unlikely to constitute a valid avenue. However, since 
Article 6 is not only restricted to criminal proceedings but, as Wadham and Arkinstall 
point out, this applies to all cases which involve the determination of "civil rights and 
obligations", so where the member state has established a criminal injuries compensation 
scheme, it would seem that the usual fair trial guarantees would apply to these 
proceedings.
108
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Another specific area where victims‟ rights may be further developed in the context of 
the criminal trial is in the sentencing process. For procedural and substantive reasons, 
criminal courts have traditionally shirked from allowing the victim any input into 
decision-making in sentencing proceedings. Principle 6(b) of the UN Declaration on 
Victims states that the judicial process should allow "the views and concerns of victims 
to be presented and considered at appropriate stages of the proceedings where their 
personal interests are affected, without prejudice to the accused . . .", and this would seem 
to be an accurate reflection of the widespread reforms in the field of sentencing in many 
domestic jurisdictions over the last 10-15 years. As such, some form of “victim impact 
statement” is frequently becoming a feature of many trials,109 especially in the USA and 
Canada.
110
  In Europe, the level of debate is growing, and is becoming a more fruitful 
area for academic and media discussion alike, particularly in the UK and Ireland.
111
 
There has been one occasion to date, where, in McCourt v UK,
112
 the issue of victim 
participation in sentencing did arise before the European Commission on Human Rights. 
Here, the mother of a murder victim complained that she had been denied a right to be 
involved in the sentencing process contrary to Article 8 ECHR. Rejecting her complaint 
as being manifestly ill-founded, the Commission stated that the UK sentencing 
framework did not reveal any lack of respect for or any interference with her right to 
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respect for family life,
113
 although did note that the victims' interests had been already 
taken note of when the Parole Board came to decide on whether to grant early release.  
 
The decision was not surprising since the Court and Commission have traditionally 
refrained from intervening in cases concerned with sentencing. However, the more recent 
decision of T and V v. UK
114
 would seem to mark a shift in thinking, when the Court 
permitted the parents of Jamie Bulger to be represented at the hearing and make 
representations to the Court. While it is unlikely in the near future that the Court will 
acknowledge some form of right for the victim to be involved in the sentencing process, 
as member states enact legislation to this effect there is every chance that in the medium 
to long term, some form of recognisable right may emerge for victims in the sentencing 
process under Article 8. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The developments which have occurred on the international platform in the past 10-20 
years for the victim have been substantial. As a result, the crime victim need not fear so 
much the prospect of reporting crime and subsequently throwing himself into the criminal 
process. Rights to information, and closer liaison with investigating agents, coupled with 
much improved procedures in the courtroom have significantly eased the strain which 
was once associated with reporting crime and adding one‟s name to the official “victims' 
list”. Yet given the rapid progression of such measures and standards to date, it can be 
legitimately speculated that such protections will be significantly enhanced within the 
next 10-20 years. Rather than these developments marking the culmination of a process, 
it would seem that we are still very much in its early days. 
 
It is also hoped that the European Court can continue to set the pace in developing the 
scope of rights. The emergence of the proactive duties on the state to prevent horizontal 
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breaches under articles 2, 3, 6 and 8 illustrate a distinct collapse between the vertical and 
horizontal divide which has, for so long left human rights discourse open to the charge 
that some victims are more important than others.  In line with this trend, it is probable 
that we can expect a more proactive approach in areas such as sentencing, victim 
compensation, substantive criminal law and evidential rules – areas in which the Court 
has been traditionally reluctant to intervene. 
 
It should be borne in mind, however, that even with widespread and comprehensive 
human rights standards in place, and even if these are binding upon the member states 
which subscribe to the relevant treaties, to some extent such protections will only ever be 
of limited effect. This is mainly due to two reasons. First, because there will always be a 
general level dissatisfaction since those affected by crime never chose to be victims in the 
first place. As such, they have no option but to participate in the adversarial criminal 
process, which is the only means of obtaining any degree of justice in most common law 
jurisdictions. The second reason applies mostly to common law systems, and concerns 
the adversarial nature of proceedings themselves. The “gladiatorial combat” between 
prosecution and defence in the trial arena, and means that victims who come to court to 
give evidence will always face some form of secondary victimization, and it is submitted 
that the system requires much more fundamental reforms to be executed at a foundational 
level if the interests of victims and witnesses are to be comprehensively protected in the 
criminal process.
 115
 
 
Any liberal theory of criminal justice would seem to require that the rights of all 
individuals within the legal process are protected, which has been affirmed through the 
international victim-orientated reforms described above. In the English case of R v DJX, 
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SCY and GCZ,
116
 Lord Lane CJ recognised the importance of interest-balancing in 
decision-making:  
 
“The learned judge has the duty on this and on all other occasions of 
endeavouring to see that justice is done…What it really means is, he has got to 
see that the system operates fairly: fairly not only to the defendants but also to the 
prosecution and also to the witnesses. Sometimes he has to make decisions where 
the balance of fairness lies.”117  
 
The relatively recent redefinition of “victims‟ rights” as “human rights” marks a 
tremendous leap forward, both for victimology and human rights discourse.
118
 The task of 
effectively enforcing these rights is still yet to be accomplished. Such rights must be 
enforceable through formal legal mechanisms, not merely aspired to through states 
signing up to soft law standards and increasing services. An effective recourse to the 
domestic and international legal protection of victims‟ rights is vital for the framing of 
holistic criminal justice policy both at national and international level.  
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